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NOTES

A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF GANG INJUNCTIONS
Wesley F. Harward*
INTRODUCTION
There were over 1.4 million active gang members in the United States as
of 20111—an increase of forty percent in gang membership from 2009.2 It is
estimated that “[g]angs are responsible for an average of 48 percent of violent crime in most jurisdictions and up to 90 percent in several others.”3
Many of the more than 33,000 gangs are increasing in sophistication and
organization.4 Additionally, these “[g]angs are increasingly engaging in nontraditional gang-related crime, such as alien smuggling, human trafficking,
and prostitution.”5
The rise in gang membership and gang violence “has overwhelmed conventional law enforcement techniques.”6 State legislatures, city attorneys,
and law enforcement officers have been forced to search for new and innova* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2015; B.A. in Economics and
B.S. in Mathematics, Brigham Young University, 2012. I would like to thank the staff of the
Notre Dame Law Review for their edits and suggestions. Most importantly, I would like to
thank my wife, Anna Harward, for her constant support and inspiration.
1 NAT’L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2011 NATIONAL
GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT: EMERGING TRENDS 9 (2011), http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/
publications/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment/2011-national-gang-threat-assessmentemerging-trends [hereinafter NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT].
2 Id. Gangs themselves, however, are hardly new. James Leito, Taking the Fight on
Crime from the Streets to the Courts: Texas’s Use of Civil Injunctions to Curb Gang Activity, 40 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2008) (“Gangs have plagued cities across the United States since
the eighteenth century.”).
3 NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 9.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Gregory S. Walston, Taking the Constitution at Its Word: A Defense of the Use of Anti-Gang
Injunctions, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 47, 48 (1999); see Ryan Young, Note, Sharpen the Blade: Void
for Vagueness and Service of Process Concerns in Civil Gang Injunctions, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV.
1001, 1006 (2009) (noting that “traditional law enforcement approaches to curbing gang
violence are ineffective”).
1345
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tive techniques that may prove to be more effective.7 Enjoining a gang (or its
members) as a public nuisance is one such innovation that is increasing in
use.
A.

Acuna—The Beginning

Public nuisance actions against criminal street gangs were first upheld by
the Supreme Court of California in the seminal case of People ex rel. Gallo v.
Acuna.8 In that case, the City of San Jose (City) sought injunctive relief
against a street gang known as the Varrio Sureño Treces (VST). An injunction was granted and appeals followed, which brought the case before the
California Supreme Court.9 The City successfully argued that the gang’s
behavior was so egregious that it both substantially and unreasonably interfered with a public right—“the comfortable enjoyment of life or property.”10
The court began its opinion by detailing the effect of the gang on the
neighborhood in question. It described Rocksprings as “an urban war
zone.”11 The four-block area was an “occupied territory.”12 Gang members
would congregate in the area at all hours and “display a casual contempt for
notions of law, order, and decency—openly drinking, smoking dope, sniffing
toluene, and even snorting cocaine laid out in neat lines on the hoods of
residents’ cars.”13 Additionally, “[m]urder, attempted murder, drive-by
shootings, assault and battery, vandalism, arson, and theft [were] commonplace” in the community.14
Residents’ property was regularly damaged as the gang members “t[ook]
over sidewalks, driveways, carports, apartment parking areas, and impede[d]
traffic on the public thoroughfares to conduct their drive-up drug bazaar.”15
Residents’ “garages [were] used as urinals; their homes commandeered as
escape routes; [and] their walls, fences, garage doors, sidewalks, and even
their vehicles turned into a sullen canvas of gang graffiti.”16 Rocksprings
residents themselves were frequently “subjected to loud talk, loud music, vulgarity, profanity, brutality, fistfights and the sound of gunfire echoing in the
streets.”17 They were “prisoners in their own homes.”18 In the community,
“[v]iolence and the threat of violence [were] constant” and “[v]erbal harass7 See Walston, supra note 6, at 74 (arguing that “the several states and their citizens
must continue to act resourcefully in finding creative solutions [to gang violence]” and
that “[a]nti-gang injunctions are one of the most promising methods of curbing urban
violence”).
8 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997).
9 Id. at 601.
10 Id. at 604.
11 Id. at 601.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
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ment, physical intimidation, threats of retaliation, and retaliation [were] the
likely fate of anyone who complain[ed] of the gang’s illegal activities” or
cooperated with the police.19
It was under these extraordinary circumstances that the district court
granted the City’s request for injunctive relief, deeming the gang to be a
public nuisance. The injunction prohibited, among other things, VST members from (1) congregating in public view with other members in Rocksprings, and/or (2) “confronting, intimidating, annoying, harassing,
threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting and/or battering any
residents . . . or visitors to ‘Rocksprings.’ ”20 The California Supreme Court
ruled that the injunction did not violate the Constitution and that it was validly issued.21
B.

Common Characteristics and Challenges

Since Acuna, many other gang injunctions have been issued in California as well as in several other jurisdictions.22 While the specific terms of the
injunctions differ in important ways, all gang injunctions share one common
feature—the “safety zone.”23
The safety zone is the heart of the injunction. It is the geographical area
over which the provisions of the injunction are enforced. In Acuna, the
safety zone was only four square blocks.24 The size of later safety zones, however, quickly increased. A later gang injunction in California covered
approximately one square mile,25 and yet another California injunction covered 6.6 square miles.26 More recently, a Utah district court issued an
injunction against a gang with a safety zone of twenty-five square miles that
encompassed almost the entire city.27 An expansion of the size of the safety
zone will obviously increase the burden on the enjoined individuals. Such an
increase in the burden may have significance in any challenge requiring the
court to balance competing interests—it may be enough to tip the scales in
the opposite direction.28
The most controversial, and arguably the most important, prohibition
common to gang injunctions is the “no-association” provision. While the
19 Id. at 601–02.
20 Id. at 624 n.3 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (listing the exact provisions of the injunction).
21 Id. at 618–19 (majority opinion). For an analysis on the constitutional challenges
presented, see infra Parts I–II.
22 These jurisdictions include Utah and Texas. See Weber Cnty. v. Ogden Trece, 321
P.3d 1067, 1080 (Utah 2013) (ruling on challenges to a gang injunction in Utah); Leito,
supra note 2, at 1051–52 (discussing the use of gang injunctions in Texas).
23 People ex rel. Totten v. Colonia Chiques, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 70, 74 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007).
24 Acuna, 929 P.2d at 615.
25 In re Englebrecht, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
26 Colonia Chiques, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 74.
27 Ogden Trece, 321 P.3d at 1072 (invalidating the injunction for insufficient process
and not reaching the constitutional issues).
28 See infra Part II.
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exact function of a no-association provision differs in important ways from
injunction to injunction, the idea remains the same. Gang members are prohibited from publicly associating with other gang members inside the safety
zone.29 This prohibition extends to all associations and includes noncriminal and seemingly harmless, commonplace activities.30 These prohibitions
are attacked on both nuisance law and constitutional grounds.31
One common hurdle throughout most gang injunctions is a challenge
in determining the proper entity or individual to sue. The simplest solution
is to name specific gang members and sue them individually. This was the
procedure followed in Acuna.32 While this method is certainly the easiest to
accomplish procedurally, it has its drawbacks. Many criminal street gangs
have hundreds, if not thousands, of members. As is to be expected in organizations of that size, membership is constantly changing with new members
joining the gang and other members leaving. In response to these challenges, city and county attorneys frequently choose to bring suit against the
gang as an entity, either in combination with33 or in lieu of naming individual members.34 When the gang is sued as an entity, suit is brought under the
theory that the gang is an unincorporated association.35 Due process con29 See, e.g., Acuna, 929 P.2d at 624 n.3 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (prohibiting the named
defendants from “[s]tanding, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in
public view with any other defendant herein, or with any other known ‘VST’ . . . member”);
Colonia Chiques, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 74–75 (prohibiting Colonia Chiques “and its active
members, as well as all persons who participate with or act in concert with the Colonia
Chiques in more than a nominal, passive, inactive or purely technical way, from engaging
in the following activities within the Safety Zone: . . . associating with known Colonia Chiques members,” but enforcing the injunction “ONLY AGAINST GANG MEMBERS who
have been SERVED, and who are in the SAFETY ZONE” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ogden Trece, 321 P.3d at 1072 (prohibiting “the alleged gang members [served with
the injunction] from . . . ‘[d]riving, standing, sitting, walking, gathering, or appearing
together with any known member of Ogden Trece anywhere in public view or anyplace
accessible to the public’” inside the safety zone (alteration in original)).
30 Scott E. Atkinson, Note, The Outer Limit of Gang Injunctions, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1693,
1712 (2006) (“Associational provisions thus prevent . . . gang members from eating
together at the same restaurant, grocery shopping together, driving each other to work or
school, or performing any number of typical family activities.”).
31 See infra Parts I–II.
32 Acuna, 929 P.2d at 602 (explaining that there were thirty-eight named defendants).
33 See Colonia Chiques, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 74 (describing that the complaint was against
the gang and 500 unnamed “Does”).
34 See Ogden Trece, 321 P.3d at 1073 (noting that the only named defendant was the
gang).
35 Colonia Chiques, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 74 (“The complaint stated that [the gang] is an
‘Unincorporated Association.’”); People ex rel. Reisig v. Broderick Boys, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d
64, 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he district attorney filed a complaint to enjoin a . . .
criminal street gang . . . alleged to be an unincorporated association.”); Ogden Trece, 321
P.3d at 1070 (holding that the gang “is an unincorporated association and amenable to
suit”).
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cerns arise when the injunction is served on individuals who were never party
to the original suit.36
C.

The Aims of This Note

This Note argues that no-association provisions can be constitutional,
given a requisite factual background, even in the face of an increase in size of
the safety zone. Furthermore, it argues that it is possible to bring suit against
a gang as an unincorporated association without naming individual defendants and not violate due process requirements. It is also possible to construct
the injunction in such a way as to enjoin gang members without violating
their due process rights.
Part I of this Note will explain how public nuisance doctrine applies to
criminal street gangs. Part II will then analyze the constitutionality of the noassociation provisions of gang injunctions, especially in light of the everincreasing size of the safety zone. Part III then examines the due process
considerations, namely the practice of serving gang injunctions on individuals who were never parties to the suit itself. This Part relates and comments
on and relates a recent federal case, which involves the first court, either
federal or state, to consider these issues. Finally, Part IV concludes by making recommendations for the factual inquiries that must be made at the trial
level and suggests further areas of research.
I.

THE PUBLIC NUISANCE DOCTRINE

As the Acuna court stated: “There are few ‘forms of action’ in the history
of Anglo-American law with a pedigree older than suits seeking to restrain
nuisances, whether public or private.”37 At its core, the public nuisance doctrine is about “balancing individual liberty against the liberties of others.”38
A public nuisance is, by its very nature, “characterized by an unreasonable
exercise of an individual is [sic] right at the expense of a public right.”39
In determining whether an activity is a nuisance, the courts must consider the totality of the circumstances and determine whether the activity
amounts to a substantial and unreasonable interference with a public right.40
The Restatement (Second) of Torts classifies public rights into five categories:
“the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or
the public convenience.”41 As Justice Brown stated in Acuna, “[i]n the public
nuisance context, the community’s right to security and protection must be
reconciled with the individual’s right to expressive and associative free36 See infra Part III.
37 Acuna, 929 P.2d at 603; see also Walston, supra note 6, at 54–56 (providing an overview of the development of the public nuisance doctrine from common law to statutory
law).
38 Walston, supra note 6, at 54.
39 Id. at 55.
40 Id. at 55–56.
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) (1979).
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dom.”42 Although the common law doctrine is increasingly being replaced
by statutes,43 they generally rely on common law principles and definitions.44
Anti-gang injunction suits are brought under a theory of public nuisance, so a correct understanding of a gang’s behavior is critical. It is the
nuisance activity of the gang, barring constitutional challenges,45 which will
govern the scope of the injunction. Since an injunction is an equitable
action, the court must balance the restrictions on gang members’ liberties
(the provisions of the injunction) with the public’s liberties of being protected. Thus, the greater the nuisance activity of the gang, the greater the
court’s ability to impose restrictive provisions in the injunction. There are
many common gang activities that may be properly classified as a nuisance,
especially illicit activities.46 Walston has explained:
A neighborhood occupied as gang “turf” becomes unsafe for local residents.
Residents’ property rights become subservient to the mob rule of the gang
members, who enter residents’ homes, deface their vehicles, threaten their
friends and families, peddle drugs, and loudly congregate on their lawns.
Such actions are utterly devoid of any public benefit and are a naked and
unmitigated interference with the public safety and welfare rights of the
local community.
Accordingly, gang activities are unreasonable under a public nuisance
analysis. Given the totality of the facts, gang activities substantially interfere
with the property rights of the members of the local community, who are
coerced into allowing gang members [sic] trample the rights of community
residents by using fear and coercion. Further, the gang has no social benefit
to mitigate its detrimental impact on the community. Thus, street gangs fall
squarely within the definition of a public nuisance.47

The size of the safety zone, then, is the proper way to balance the equities of the injunction. On the one hand, there are the burdens of the injunction on the gang members. On the other, there is the desired abatement of
the public nuisance itself.48 The size of the safety zone should bear a one-toone correspondence with the geographical locations of the gang’s nuisance
42
43

Acuna, 929 P.2d at 603.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-160.1 (2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-5901 (West 2014);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2425 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-806, 78B-61101(2)(e) (West 2014).
44 See Walston, supra note 6, at 56–57.
45 See infra Part III.
46 See Walston, supra note 6, at 56–57.
47 Id. (footnotes omitted).
48 It is beyond the scope of this Note to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the injunction at reducing both serious and minor crime. For more information regarding the effectiveness of such injunctions, see Matthew D. O’Deane & Stephen A. Morreale, Evaluation of
the Effectiveness of Gang Injunctions in California, 2 J. CRIM. JUST. RES., no. 1, 2011, at 1–32.
But see ACLU FOUND. OF S. CAL., FALSE PREMISE, FALSE PROMISE: THE BLYTHE STREET GANG
INJUNCTION AND ITS AFTERMATH (1997), available at https://www.aclusocal.org/issues/pol
ice-practices/false-premise-false-promise-blythe-street-gang-injunction/ (concluding that
gang injunctions are ineffective).
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activity. In that way it is really the gang’s own activities that determine the
size of the safety zone.
While some have criticized the apparent trend of increasingly large
safety zones,49 any analysis that considers only the size of the safety zone is
incomplete. Public nuisance law requires a balancing of the equities. A large
gang which frequently engages in public nuisance behavior over a wide area
should not be beyond the power of the court to enjoin simply because it is
large. That would yield the perverse result that the larger, and likely more
powerful, gangs would not be subject to an injunction precisely because they
engage in too much public nuisance activity. Of course the courts do not
have a blank check to make the safety zone as large as they please. The city
must prove that the benefit to the public outweighs the burdens of those
enjoined.
A.

The Presence Theory

The no-association provisions of gang injunctions are commonly challenged on the grounds that they seemingly prohibit non-nuisance activity—
congregating in public with other gang members.50 The challenge is that
the no-association “provisions thus prevent . . . gang members from eating
together at the same restaurant, grocery shopping together, driving each
other to work or school, or performing any number of typical family activities.”51 This behavior is viewed as being non-nuisance, and thus different
from the behavior described in the Acuna case.52
I argue, however, that it is possible to classify this behavior too as a public nuisance. The Utah Supreme Court explained in Weber County v. Ogden
Trece53 that during testimony at trial:
[A] self-identified “shot caller” [leader of the gang] . . . testified that the two
main rules of the gang are to not “rank out” and to “represent to the fullest,”
which means to “always let everybody know where you are from.” . . .
49 See Atkinson, supra note 30, at 1696 (“These injunctions are problematic because
they . . . expand the geographical scope of injunctions without demanding rigorous proof
of nuisance activity and without regard for burdens on gang members’ associational
rights . . . .”).
50 This concern is really two objections rolled into one. The first objection is that the
behavior is not really a nuisance, so it cannot be enjoined under a public nuisance theory.
The second is that the no-association provision is so broad, and includes so much nonnuisance activity, that it violates the Constitution. See id. at 1706 (“When no constitutional
rights are burdened by injunction provisions, an injunction’s outer bounds (in terms of
both proscribed conduct and geographic scope) will be determined by equity. However,
when constitutional rights are implicated by an injunction, those rights demand protection
even in the absence of limiting equitable principles.”).
51 Id. at 1712.
52 See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 618 (Cal. 1997) (holding that the
conduct of gang members was a public nuisance).
53 321 P.3d 1067 (Utah 2013).
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[The gang] Trece derives its power and influence in the community
from exactly this type of “representing.” It is one of the two cardinal rules of
the gang that members represent the gang wherever they go. This representation by the members’ [gang] clothing, the gang signs, the tattoos, and the
graffiti has the effect of making the gang almost omnipresent in the community. Trece’s presence is felt even when its members are not engaged in
gang-related activity because they constantly use the name of the gang and
“represent.”54

This evidence introduces another possible nuisance activity that I call
the “presence theory.” Under this theory, because the gang members make
efforts to constantly identify themselves as gang members through their
clothing, tattoos, gang signs, and speech, their presence in public, as a group,
may constitute nuisance activity. They have affirmatively committed to
“represent” the gang and what it stands for—namely illicit activity. The very
concept of a “gang” is inseparably connected to a group, and the word
“gang” itself is defined in terms of multiple people.55 Most gangs rely on
intimidation, threats, and violence to maintain power over their “turf.”56 A
group of self-identified gang members furthers the objective of the gang by
their mere presence in public, even when they are not engaged in illicit activity. The point is to make the gang’s presence felt. Clearly intimidation,
threats, and violence are more effective when there is a group of gang members than when each member is alone.
This is not an unintentional result. The intimidation felt by citizens of
the community and their recognition of the implicit threat is not an overreaction to some foundationless fear. The gang is purposely trying to instill
this fear in the community as a form of control. As Walston noted, “[e]ach
gang member, in joining his fellow gang members on the ‘turf,’ knowingly
furthers the gang’s criminal purpose by providing additional strength to the
presence of the gang.”57 As noted above, the requirement of “representing”
the gang is one of the two cardinal rules.58 The gang’s name is its brand.59
Just like any other brand, it is only valuable insofar as it is recognized—recog54 Id. at 1076. The Utah Supreme Court was describing this testimony in determining
whether the gang conducts business under a common name, which is a requirement for
the gang to be sued in Utah as an unincorporated association. Id.
55 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 748 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “gang” as “[a] group of
persons who go about together or act in concert, esp[ecially] for antisocial or criminal
purposes”).
56 See Walston, supra note 6, at 63–64 (“Gang members congregate for the unlawful
purpose of establishing a neighborhood as their ‘turf.’ Once a neighborhood is claimed to
be gang turf, it is subject to the lawless activities of the street gang, which frequently
include drug trafficking and violence. Thus, gang activities may not be classified as expressive of any meaningful viewpoints.” (footnotes omitted)).
57 Id. at 66.
58 Ogden Trece, 321 P.3d at 1076. There is an important caution, however, to the presence theory. A district court cannot simply take for granted that gang members are
required to “represent” their gang. Rather, there must be a sufficient factual showing demonstrating that the gang does use its presence in an intimidating and threatening way. See
People v. Englebrecht (Englebrecht II), 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
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nized for the quality of the goods or services associated with the business. In
the case of a gang, its business includes “ ‘obtain[ing] money through many
different type[s] of illegal activities, from selling drugs to trafficking in stolen
property.’ The gang’s revenue is generated through ‘criminal activity such as
burglaries, thefts, robberies, drug dealing, etc.’ ”60 The increase in visibility
of gang members in the community increases the control or, at the very least,
the public’s perception of the gang’s control over the community.
Gang members’ public associations are, therefore, part of the public nuisance activity and may be enjoined in equity. As the Acuna court noted:
It is the threat of collective conduct by gang members loitering in a specific and narrowly described neighborhood that the provision is sensibly
intended to forestall. . . . [W]e cannot say that the ban on any association
between gang members within the neighborhood goes beyond what is required
to abate the nuisance.61

II.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
A.

TO THE

NO-ASSOCIATION PROVISION

Associational Rights

Even if the injunction is appropriate after the proper balancing test
required by public nuisance law, the injunction may still be invalid if it violates gang members’ constitutional rights.62 The first possible constitutional
challenge to the no-association provision is that it violates gang members’
association rights as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Supreme Court has explained that while there is a generalized right of
association,63 there are two types of protected associations: (1) intimate association and (2) expressive association.64 As explained by Justice Brennan:
Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected “freedom of
association” in two distinct senses. In one line of decisions, the Court has
(“While it may be lawful to restrict such activity, it is also extraordinary. The government . . . [must] firmly establish[ ] the facts making such restrictions necessary.”).
59 Ogden Trece, 321 P.3d at 1075. The Utah Supreme Court stated:
The gang very jealously protects its own name. It goes to great lengths in order to
protect its brand. It has internal processes for induction of new members and
advancement into leadership positions. It also punishes individuals who falsely
attempt to identify themselves as gang members. Members who are “jumped out”
of the gang must cover up their tattoos and no longer claim membership in the
gang.
Id. at 1076.
60 Id. at 1075 (quoting trial court order).
61 People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 615 (Cal. 1997).
62 See Atkinson, supra note 30, at 1706 (“When no constitutional rights are burdened
by injunction provisions, an injunction’s outer bounds (in terms of both proscribed conduct and geographic scope) will be determined by equity. However, when constitutional
rights are implicated by an injunction, those rights demand protection even in the absence
of limiting equitable principles.”).
63 City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
64 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984).
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concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human
relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because
of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that
is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty. In
another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—
speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of
religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as
an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.65

These protections are not absolute and “the nature and degree of constitutional protection afforded freedom of association may vary depending on
the extent to which one or the other aspect of the constitutionally protected
liberty is at stake in a given case.”66 Even when an association is constitutionally protected, however, “[i]nfringements . . . may be justified by regulations
adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of
ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedom.”67
In the context of gang injunctions, then, there is a two-part test to determine whether an no-association provision is unconstitutional. The first
inquiry is whether or not the association in question is afforded any constitutional protection. If there is some protection, then a balancing test is used to
determine whether there is a sufficient government interest to allow the provision. Factors to be included are the nature of the government’s interest,
the extent of the intrusion on the protected associations, and whether other
less intrusive means exist to accomplish the government’s interest.68
B.

The Right to Intimate Association

The first type of protected association is the right to intimate association.
This right is “exemplified by personal affiliations that ‘attend the creation
and sustenance of a family—marriage . . . the raising and education of children . . . and cohabitation with one’s relatives.’ ”69 These associations necessarily “involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few
other individuals with whom one shares . . . distinctively personal aspects of
one’s life.”70 Importantly, the Supreme Court has given guidance on identifying the types of associations protected under this right. These associations
“are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of
65 Id.
66 Id. at 618.
67 Id. at 623.
68 See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 605 (Cal. 1997) (“The unreasonableness of a given interference represents a judgment reached by comparing the social utility
of an activity against the gravity of the harm it inflicts, taking into account a handful of
relevant factors.” (citations omitted)); supra text accompanying note 61.
69 Acuna, 929 P.2d at 608 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619).
70 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619–20.
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selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion
from others in critical aspects of the relationship.”71
It is clear that the constitutional right to intimate association does not
protect the gang as a whole.72 A street gang fails almost all of the distinguishing factors listed above. Many street gangs are large organizations.73 They
have “hundreds of members, each having varying degrees of involvement in
gang activities and not all of whom know each other.”74 They are not established for an intimate purpose but rather to exercise territorial control and
carry out criminal activities.75
Even though the gang as a whole does not have a constitutional right to
intimate association, its individual members certainly do. The Acuna court
briefly dealt with arguments that the no-association provision in the Rocksprings injunction violated gang members’ intimate association rights. The
court stated that “protected rights of association in the intimate sense are
those existing along a narrow band of affiliations that permit deep and
enduring personal bonds to flourish, inculcating and nourishing civilization’s fundamental values, against which even the state is powerless to
intrude.”76 It then concluded that “[w]e do not . . . believe that the activities
of the gang and its members in Rocksprings at issue here are either ‘private’
or ‘intimate’ as constitutionally defined.”77 This was in spite of the fact that
the gang members “exercise[d] some discrimination in choosing associates
[by a] selective process of inclusion and exclusion.”78 This outcome is unsurprising given that the injunction covered only four square blocks and none of
the enjoined defendants lived in the safety zone.79
Arguably, it is a much different situation when some of the enjoined
individuals live inside the safety zone. This was the case in Englebrecht II.80 In
a case to abate a public nuisance brought by the District Attorney of San
Diego County, the trial court found that Mr. Englebrecht was an active member of the Posole gang.81 The Posole gang was enjoined with the usual provi71 Id.; see also Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 546–47 (1987)
(holding that the constitutional right to intimate association did not apply to the Rotary
Club); Acuna, 929 P.2d at 608 (explaining the essential attributes of such associations).
72 See Leito, supra note 2, at 1070–71.
73 See Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony in
Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2273–75 (1998).
74 See Walston, supra note 6, at 62.
75 Id. at 62–63.
76 Acuna, 929 P.2d at 609.
77 Id.; see also NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 9–10 (describing
gang activities).
78 Acuna, 929 P.2d at 609 (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. State Club Ass’n. v. City
of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988)).
79 Acuna, 929 P.2d at 601.
80 Englebrecht II, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that “many
gang members are related and live in the [safety zone]”).
81 Id. at 742.
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sions.82 Many of the gang members lived inside the safety zone of this
injunction.83 Mr. Englebrecht contended, among other things, that the noassociation provision “should have been limited in manner to lessen its effect
on familial relationships.”84 He claimed that the no-association provision violated his constitutional rights to intimate association because it interfered
with familial relations because many of the gang members were closely
related.85
The court acknowledged that “many gang members are also related by
family, and . . . the injunction’s associational restrictions may affect, in the
[safety zone], contact between those family members.”86 It held, however,
that those facts alone are “not determinative” and that “[w]hile the injunction may place some burden on family contact in the target area, it by no
means has . . . a fundamental impact on general family association.”87 It
appears to have arrived at this conclusion based on two facts: (1) “[t]he
injunction places no restrictions on contact between any individuals outside
the [safety zone]” and (2) “[i]n the [safety zone] the injunction merely
requires gang members not to associate in public.”88 It is unclear, however,
which of these two factors was weighed most heavily by the court. If the former factor is weighed heavily, then, presumably, injunctions with larger geographical areas could run afoul of the Constitution. If, however, the latter
factor is the most important, then future injunctions are permissible regardless of size, so long as the gang members retain the right to associate in
private.
Rather than simply declare that there was no impingement on the constitutional right to intimate associations, the court proceeded to the second
part of the test—the balancing prong. The court agreed with Englebrecht
that “gang and familial ties often overlap and gang membership is often multigenerational.”89 It used this fact, however, as support for the necessity of
the prohibition’s inclusion of familial gang members in the no-association
provision. The court said that “any change in the injunction to allow greater
association of family related gang members would tend to limit the effectiveness of the association provisions . . . [and] would . . . also make it more
difficult to enforce.”90 It then held that “[t]he injunction as issued does not
impermissibly burden Englebrecht’s associational rights.”91
Not everyone agreed with the court’s decision. Critics have challenged
the court’s reasoning based on two mutually exclusive and exhaustive pos82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id.
Id. at 757.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sibilities.92 Either family-related gang members comprise a large number of
the individuals enjoined or they do not: “If related gang members are a small
minority, any exception to an injunction’s associational provision allowing
family association would necessarily ease the injunction’s strictures only on a
select few.”93 Since the easement is small, this injunction would still remain
effective.94 This argument, though, does not address courts’ concerns about
enforceability.95 A provision providing an exception for related family members would require law enforcement officers to know the family tree of all
enjoined gang members. Even if there are only a small number of related
gang members, it would still be much more difficult to enforce.96
The second argument is that if, in contrast, there are many gang members, then a “family member exception would apply to large numbers of gang
members” and “the injunction would necessarily prevent less collective gang
conduct.”97 Under that scenario, though, the no-association provision would
then necessarily impact many gang members’ fundamental rights of association with family so as to be unconstitutional.98 This argument is fundamentally flawed because it is incomplete. As noted above, in order for the
provision to be unconstitutional not only must the right to intimate association be impinged—the infringement on the rights must also not be outweighed by a compelling state interest. It is the latter requirement that the
argument fails to address. The state interest in abating the nuisance still
remains.99 It is that state interest that must be weighed against the infringement on the right to intimate association. Englebrecht II’s two principal arguments are still perfectly applicable: the injunction only applies in the safety
zone and it only prevents public associations.100
C.

The Right to Expressive Association

The second type of protected association is the right to expressive association. The right to expressive association protected by the First Amendment
is not limited to political assemblies101 but is available for groups who gather
together for “a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”102 This “protection [of] collective effort on behalf
92 See Atkinson, supra note 30, at 1713.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Englebrecht II, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758.
96 See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 615 (Cal. 1997) (explaining that “the
[associational] prohibitions enumerated in [the injunction] are not easily divisible”).
97 Atkinson, supra note 30, at 1713.
98 See id.
99 See supra Part I (detailing the state’s interest).
100 Englebrecht II, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758.
101 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (“[W]e have protected forms of
‘association’ that are not political . . . .”).
102 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984); see Acuna, 929 P.2d at 608 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622).
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of shared goals is especially important in preserving political and cultural
diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the
majority.”103 In determining whether an organization’s associations enjoy
First Amendment protection, the Supreme Court has considered factors such
as the following: (1) whether the members “take positions on ‘public questions,’ ”104 (2) whether the organization “pertain[s] to the social, legal, and
economic benefit of the members”105 and (3) the nature of the association.106 The Court has cautioned that while “[i]t is possible to find some
kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for example, walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall . . .
such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the
First Amendment.”107
The injunction in Acuna was challenged for violating gang members’
right to expressive association.108 The lower appellate court had held that
the no-association provision violated the First Amendment by denying gang
members’ right to associate with fellow gang members.109 The California
Supreme Court disagreed.110 It held that the First Amendment offered no
protection for the gang members’ associations.111 There was no evidence
that the gang’s activities within the safety zone established “an association of
individuals formed ‘for the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious activities.’ ”112 Indeed there was no evidence that the gang engaged in
any kind of protected “ends”113 at all—be they political, religious, social, educational, economic, or cultural.114 The court ended its analysis by relying on
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.,115 stating that “[f]reedom of association, in the sense protected by the First Amendment, ‘does not extend to
103 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
104 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987).
105 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
106 See City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
107 Id. at 25 (holding that “the activity of . . . dance-hall patrons—coming together to
engage in recreational dancing—is not protected by the First Amendment”).
108 See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 608–09 (Cal. 1997) (analyzing the
“[a]ssociational [i]nterests” of the gang).
109 Id. at 608.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. (quoting Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987)).
113 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
114 See Walston, supra note 6, at 63–64 (“A plain examination of the attributes of urban
street gangs reveals that they do not advance any expressive purpose. Even the opponents
of anti-gang injunctions cannot deny that the activities of street gangs are illicit. Gang
members congregate for the unlawful purpose of establishing a neighborhood as their
‘turf.’ Once a neighborhood is claimed to be gang turf, it is subject to the lawless activities
of the street gang, which frequently include drug trafficking and violence. Thus, gang
activities may not be classified as expressive of any meaningful viewpoints.” (footnotes
omitted)).
115 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
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joining with others for the purpose of depriving third parties of their lawful
rights.’ ”116
While gang members may not be currently engaged in any sort of protected behavior under the Constitution’s guarantee of the right to expressive
association, it may prevent any future behavior that would be protected. This
poses special difficulties when the safety zone encompasses governmental
buildings.117 The problem is that under the no-association provisions
gang members would not be allowed to petition the government as a group
for redress of any perceived grievances while they were within the [safety
zone]. . . . Gang members would not be allowed to stand in line together at a
polling place on Election Day while exercising their right to vote. Situations
where government buildings are located in the enjoined area are especially
problematic: the [Colonia Chiques] injunction . . . envelops both the . . .
[c]ity [h]all and [police station] buildings, effectively preventing gang members from picketing their local government and law enforcement
agencies.118

This type of situation crossed the line from hypothetical to realistic in
Utah’s Trece injunction. There, because the courthouse was within the
safety zone, legal counsel for the alleged gang members advised their clients
not to attend the proceedings because that would have been a violation of
the preliminary injunction.119
While these situations raise important challenges to no-association provisions, there is a simple solution. Careful drafting of the language of the
injunction could simply exclude government buildings from the safety zone.
This solution has several practical advantages: it remains very simple to
enforce, it does not meaningfully decrease the efficacy of the injunction,
and, most importantly, it provides gang members the opportunity to exercise
their rights to protest the government and appear in court.
An exclusion of, for example, the police department, city hall, and
courthouses would not make the injunction much more difficult to enforce.
Law enforcement officers would simply know that, on those areas, the injunction was not enforceable. There is no reason to think this makes it any
harder to enforce than any of the other boundary lines. It also has the added
116 See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 609 (quoting Madsen, 512 U.S. at 776).
117 As the size of safety zones being used grows it is more likely that government buildings will be included. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text (discussing the trend
of increasingly large safety zones).
118 Atkinson, supra note 30, at 1716.
119 Brief of Appellants Roman Hernandez, Chase Aeschlimann, and Jesse Aeschlimann
at 32, Weber Cnty. v. Ogden Trece, 321 P.3d 1067 (Utah 2013) (No. 20120852-SC) (“When
it was brought to the district court’s attention that the Injunction even precluded alleged
members from attending court at the same time in this case, the district court remarked
that it would ‘probably’ permit more than one alleged gang member to attend hearings, if
defense counsel had sought permission in advance, an exception that (aside from an
unworkable and lengthy ‘hardship exemption process’) is nowhere in the Injunction itself
and underscores its arbitrary enforcement.”).
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advantage of being a bright-line rule that may alleviate any subjectivity in
enforcement.120
It is unlikely that such a limited exclusion would decrease the efficacy of
the injunction. The purpose of the gang injunction is to abate the public
nuisance behavior of gangs. This behavior includes criminal acts as well as
intimidation and threats.121 It is very unlikely that the criminal street gangs
will be able to establish their turf in these locations.122 Government buildings (especially police stations) are bound to have security and be guarded,
which will already deter the behavior the injunction seeks to prevent. Furthermore, given that there is security at all of these buildings, it is unlikely
that gangs’ efforts to maintain control by constantly “representing” will similarly be unfruitful.123 This will undercut gangs’ omnipresence and prevent
any intimidation.
Lastly, and most importantly, it provides the gang with adequate opportunities to exercise its right to protest. Gang members would be able to
attend court together to represent their interests. They would also be able to
stage protests at city hall to engage in their protected rights (including, perhaps, to protest the injunction itself). The gang, and its members, would still
be able to petition the government for redress as a group.
III.

DUE PROCESS CONCERNS—A WATERSHED CASE?

In addition to challenging the substantive provisions of gang injunctions, critics also challenge the injunctions as violating the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Those challenges have increased as
the practice of suing a gang as an entity, rather than the individual gang
members themselves, has become more common. When a gang is sued as an
entity and an injunction is entered, there exists the difficulty of determining
who specifically is a gang member. Regardless of whether “gang member” is
a defined term in an injunction, there is always a question of who determines
whether the individual to be served actually meets the definition. Is it a
judge? The police? Some other official? Recently the Ninth Circuit ruled on
120 This is in contrast to an exclusion that provided that gang members could gather
within the safety zone for the purpose of a protest, where there is much more subjectivity
since the law enforcement officer has to make a determination of whether there is an
actual protest.
121 See supra Part I (discussing the public nuisance behavior of criminal street gangs).
122 See Walston, supra note 6, at 53, 62–64 (stating that “the activities of street gangs rely
on territorial control carried out by violence and threats of violence,” and that “[g]ang
members congregate for the unlawful purpose of establishing a neighborhood as their
‘turf’”); see also Ogden Trece, 321 P.3d at 1070 (explaining the district court’s findings that
members of the gang “commit crime for the purpose of intimidating rival gang members,
asserting their dominance over an area, intimidating citizens and witnesses, and obtaining
money through many different types of illegal activities, from selling drugs to trafficking in
stolen property”).
123 See supra Part I (discussing what I call the “presence theory” of gang nuisance
behavior).
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a due process claim in Vasquez v. Rackauckas.124 This was the first time such a
claim was heard by a federal circuit court.125
While establishing the facts of the case, the Vasquez court noted that
“[o]ur analysis depends in significant part on the procedural history of the
state case. We therefore describe the parties’ litigation decisions and the relevant state and federal [court] orders in some detail.”126 It is necessary, for
the same reason, to include the facts of the case here. In February 2009, the
Orange County District Attorney’s (OCDA) office filed a public nuisance in
state court against the Orange Varrio Cypress Criminal Street Gang
(OVC).127 The named individuals in the suit were alleged to be “members,
agents, servants, employees” or “persons acting under, in concert with, for
the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with” the gang.128 The
complaint alleged various criminal and nuisance activity allegedly committed
by OVC including “attempt[ed] murders, shootings, robberies, assaults, burglaries, felony gang graffiti and the illegal sale of controlled substances” as
well as vandalism and trespassing.129
The OCDA also filed an application for a preliminary injunction against
the defendants.130 The court granted the OCDA’s motion to serve the complaint on the OVC via a named defendant, Patrick DeHerrera.131 Additionally, the OCDA served “numerous individuals named in the state court
complaint, including the current Plaintiff-Appellees, with the complaint and
the . . . documents in support of the preliminary injunction.”132 Thirty-two
individuals filed answers or otherwise formally appeared.133 The state court
granted a preliminary injunction against the gang and the defendants who
had not appeared.134 That preliminary injunction was soon extended to
include eighteen other adult defendants who were unrepresented by counsel.135 The court also set a hearing as to other adult defendants and all juvenile defendants.136
Before that hearing “some of the adult defendants represented by counsel—including plaintiff-appellee Miguel Lara—filed motions opposing the
entry of a preliminary injunction against them as individuals.”137 In support
of these motions the defendants filed their own declarations contesting,
124 734 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2013).
125 Id. at 1030 (“[N]o court—either state or federal—has previously addressed the particular due process issue presented here.”).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. (alteration in original).
130 Id. at 1031.
131 Id.
132 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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among other things, the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that they
were active members of the OVC gang.138
The court denied OCDA’s motion for a preliminary injunction as to the
juvenile defendants as well as to some of the named defendants who were
represented by counsel, including one of the current plaintiff-appellees,
Randy Bastida.139 “Patrick DeHerrera, the person on whom OCDA chose to
serve the complaint on behalf of OVC as an entity,” was also excluded from
the preliminary injunction.140 These individuals were excluded from the
preliminary injunction for lack of evidence that they were active participants
of the gang.141 The court granted the preliminary injunction against some
of the other named defendants including plaintiff-appellee Miguel Lara.142
Shortly after the hearing, Orange County “filed a request to dismiss from
the case, without prejudice, sixty-two individual defendants, including the
thirty-two adults and juveniles who had filed a general denial or an answer
and all unrepresented juvenile defendants.”143 Orange County did this
“because of the aggressive effort on [the] part of those individuals to defend
themselves in court.”144 The court granted this dismissal request.145
Orange County then “requested and obtained a default judgment,
including a permanent injunction . . . against OVC as an entity.”146 The
injunction named as parties all of the individuals who had not been dismissed by Orange County.147 The terms of the injunction were very similar
to the other injunctions previously considered and included a no-association
provision, prohibitions against using gang signs, possessing weapons, possessing illegal drugs, as well as a curfew provision.148 The injunction applied not
only to named defendants but to any of “OVC’s members, without regard to
whether such individuals were acting on behalf of OVC or, except as specified in the [injunction], with other OVC members, when engaged in proscribed activities.”149
Importantly, the injunction did “not provide any procedures for the parties or the [state court] to determine which, if any, unnamed parties were
138 Id.
139 Id. There were over twenty defendants originally named in the suit who were
excluded from the preliminary injunction for insufficient evidence. Id. at 1032.
140 Id. at 1031.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 1031–32.
143 Id. at 1032.
144 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1031–33. The Vasquez court conveniently attached a copy of the injunction as
Exhibit A to its opinion. See id. at 1057–72.
149 Id. at 1033 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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‘members’ of OVC and therefore subject to the [injunction’s] terms.”150 It
also had no expiration date.151
Within weeks after the default judgment was entered, the police department, at the instruction of the OCDA, began serving the injunction on both
individuals named in the suit as well as on individuals who had originally
been named but who the OCDA voluntarily dismissed.152 Within just a few
months at least forty-eight individuals had been served with the injunction
that had previously been voluntarily dismissed by the OCDA from the suit.153
In addition to the terms of the injunction itself, the police served a
“Notice” which advised that:
YOU ARE HEREBY PUT ON NOTICE THAT ON MAY 14, 2009, JUDGE
KAZUHARU MAKINO SIGNED AN ORDER FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION AGAINST THE ORANGE VARRIO CYPRESS CRIMINAL STREET
GANG.
ALL MEMBERS OF THE GANG ARE [HEREBY] SUBJECT TO THE
TERMS OF THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION.
ALL MEMBERS OF THE GANG, WHETHER OR NOT NAMED IN THE
ORIGINAL LAWSUIT . . . AND LATER DISMISSED FROM THE LAWSUIT . . . ARE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THE PERMANENT GANG
INJUNCTION . . . .
ALL PERSONS DESCRIBED ABOVE WILL FACE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE SECTION 166(a)(4) FOR ANY WILLFUL VIOLATION OF ANY PROVISION LISTED IN THE PERMANENT
GANG INJUNCTION.154

The state court “had no role in reviewing or approving the notice.”155
About four months after the injunction was granted, various individuals156 brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the heads of the
OCDA and the police department alleging that the “dismiss-and-serve strategy” violated the Due Process Clause.157 The plaintiffs sought an injunction
barring the county from enforcing the injunction “without first providing
them with a full constitutionally . . . adequate hearing.”158
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1033–34 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1034.
Id. Four individuals brought suit and
sought to represent two classes: (1) adults and minors named as individual
defendants in the state case, who appeared . . . in [the state court] to defend
themselves and were voluntarily dismissed by [OCDA], and (2) minors named as
individual defendants in the state case for whom no guardian ad litem was
appointed and who were voluntarily dismissed by OCDA.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
157 Id.
158 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The district court held an eleven-day bench trial.159 Eventually, the
court ruled that the “Defendants deprived the Plaintiffs and those similarly
situated of their constitutionally protected liberty or property interests without adequate procedural protections.”160 The court granted an injunction
prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the order against the plaintiffs.161
An appeal was filed bringing the case before the Ninth Circuit Court.162
The court began its due process analysis by quoting United States v. Juvenile Male,163 which explains that “[w]e analyze a procedural due process
claim in two steps. The first asks whether there exists a liberty or property
interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines
whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.”164
A.

Step 1—Was There an Interference with a Protected Liberty
or Property Interest?

The first step is a threshold test to determine whether any protected
rights are implicated. To pass this threshold a plaintiff need not demonstrate
that the state has impermissibly interfered with a protected right, merely that
it has interfered with one. As to the first step, the court agreed with the
district court that the injunction “profoundly implicates liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause, including rights of free movement, association, and speech, and that [the county’s] conduct interferes with those
protected liberty interests.”165 This is unsurprising since the design of the
159 Id. At trial the district court “hear[d] testimony from fourteen witnesses, receiv[ed]
more than 100 exhibits, and personally tour[ed] the area . . . covered by the [safety zone].”
Id.
160 Id. (quoting Vasquez v. Rackauckas, No. SACV 09-1090 VBF, 2011 WL 1791091, at
*15 (C.D. Cal. May 10, 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
161 Id. The district court was careful to note that it was “not instructing the state court as to
the nature of any hearing . . . . [T]he Court’s order [is] directed to the Defendants, and not
the state court.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
162 Id.
163 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012).
164 Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1013).
165 Id. The court explained that the above mentioned liberties were subject to due
process protection:
“Freedom of speech and . . . other freedoms encompassed by the First
Amendment always have been viewed as fundamental components of the liberty
safeguarded by the Due Process Clause.” First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 780 (1978). “[T]he freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is” also
“part of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause.” City of Chi. v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) (plurality opinion). The Constitution likewise
guarantees the “fundamental right of free movement” to both adults and minors.
See Nunez ex rel. Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 1997)
(invalidating a juvenile curfew ordinance under strict scrutiny review). The
Order places a heavy burden on the exercise of these protected liberty interests.
Id.
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injunction is to restrict gang members’ behavior—which, under any definition, is interference.
The court then turned from the terms of the injunction to Orange
County’s actions in subjecting the plaintiffs to the injunction.166 While the
injunction did not specifically name the plaintiffs, Orange County subjected
them to the injunction.167 It notified the plaintiffs “they could face [criminal
prosecution] for violating the [injunction’s] terms.”168 County officials also
testified at trial to a “ ‘policy [of] arrest[ing], transport[ing], and book[ing]
those Plaintiffs alleged to have violated the [injunction] and hold[ing] them
pending bond or arraignment, rather than citing and releasing them,’ as well
as a ‘policy of seeking increased bail amounts for violations of the [injunction].’ ”169 The court believed these actions “also constitute further interfere[nce] with liberty interests triggering scrutiny under the Due Process
Clause.”170
Having determined that Orange County’s actions constituted an “interfere[nce] . . . by the State,”171 the court turned “to an examination of
whether [the county] was obligated to provide Plaintiffs with additional procedural protections.”172
B.

Step 2—Were the Procedures Attendant to the Deprivation of the Liberty
Interests Constitutionally Sufficient?

The court began by following the framework provided by the Supreme
Court in Mathews v. Eldridge,173 which directed the court to examine:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
166 Id. at 1043.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. (alterations in original).
170 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States
v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1013 (9th Cir. 2012)). The court also provided some examples of plaintiffs who had refrained from exercising their rights because of the injunction.
Among those examples was a man who “no longer goes anywhere in the injunction area
with his brother, with whom he lives and who has also been served with the [injunction].”
Id. at 1044. Another pair of brothers, whose grandfather had a stroke and was taken to a
hospital within the safety zone, had to choose whether to violate the injunction. Id. And
yet another plaintiff, who used to participate in vigils, demonstrations, and protests within
the safety zone, “ceased doing so after being served with the [injunction], for fear he
would be violating its terms by confronting and challenging government policies and associating with individuals on the injunction list.” Id.
171 Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1013.
172 Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1044.
173 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-3\NDL309.txt

1366

unknown

Seq: 22

notre dame law review

2-MAR-15

14:29

[vol. 90:3

involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.174

These Mathews factors are to be balanced remembering “the requirements of due process are ‘flexible and cal[l] for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands.’ ”175 The district court concluded that
the Mathews factors “ ‘weigh clearly in favor’ of the conclusion that [the
county] violated [the Plaintiffs’] procedural due process rights by failing to
provide any form of hearing before subjecting them to the [injunction].”176
The Ninth Circuit agreed.177
Following the Mathews framework, the court considered the strength of
the private interests at stake.178 The interests, as noted above,179 were very
strong,180 and the safety zone encompassed a geographical area in which
many individuals spend much of their lives.181 Additionally, the injunction is
permanent with no expiration or sunset provision.182 Thus, the first Mathews
factor—the plaintiffs’ interests—was “truly weighty.”183
The second Mathews factor considered is the risk of an erroneous deprivation through the procedures used; in this case that a non-gang member
would be erroneously labeled as a gang member and subject to the provisions
of the injunction.184 The court identified four considerations that weigh on
this second factor: (1) “the fact-intensive nature of assessing whether an individual is an active gang member or participant;” (2) “the adequacy of the
174 Id. at 334–35; see Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1044 (quoting Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d
982, 1000 (9th Cir. 2006)).
175 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–25 (2005) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972)); see Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1044.
176 Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1044.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1044–45.
179 See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing the private interests in determining whether there was any state interference with a right protected by the Due Process
Clause).
180 Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1045.
181 Id.
As the district court found after personally touring the Safety Zone, the geographical area covered by the Order encompasses “dense residential areas,” “several
schools,” “at least four parks,” “the Chapman University campus and its surroundings,” “the historic downtown Orange Area . . . which includes a vibrant commercial district,” “government buildings and offices (including Orange City Hall, the
police station, and the public library),” “a hospital,” and “hundreds of retail and
commercial business [sic], and hundreds of homes and apartments.”
Id. (quoting Vasquez v. Rackauckas, No. SACV 09-1090 VBF, 2011 WL 1791091, at *6 (C.D.
Cal. May 10, 2011)).
182 Id. As the Mathews Court explained, “the possible length of wrongful deprivation . . . is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private
interests.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976) (quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419
U.S. 379, 389 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1045.
183 Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1045.
184 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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procedures [the county] used in making that determination;” (3) “the value
of additional procedural safeguards;” and (4) “the sufficiency of post-deprivation remedies.”185
Under California law “ ‘an active gang member is a person who participates in or acts in concert with’ a gang, where ‘[t]he participation . . . [is]
more than nominal, passive, inactive, or purely technical.’ ”186 Additionally,
under California law, “the state has the burden of demonstrating active gang
membership by ‘clear and convincing evidence,’ rather than a lower ‘preponderance’ standard, given ‘the importance of the interests affected by [such
an] injunction.”187
Determining whether an individual is an “active gang member or participant” is a fact-intensive inquiry.188 This inquiry is complicated by the fact
that gangs are often “loose knit [and] without structure.”189 Gangs do not
have organization minutes, formal membership records, or other normal
means of identification.190 During the trial at the district court, experts testified to the fluid nature of gangs in general and to the OVC in particular.191
They explained that “most gang members eventually leave gangs, making it
difficult to determine membership or participation at any single time based
on a past record of an individual’s involvement in a gang.”192 As such, the
district court found that the determination of whether “an individual is an
active participant of a criminal street gang is a multifactored, complex[,] and
fact specific inquiry.”193 The circuit court agreed and noted that the risk of
error is significant “without any participation by, or opportunity to provide
evidence on behalf of, the individual served with the [injunction] and,
according to [the county,] putatively covered by it.”194
The court then examined the procedures actually used to determine
which individuals would be served with the injunction. Testimony at trial
established that the county “lacked clear standards for determining on whom
to serve the [injunction].”195 There was “no fixed list or set criteria to determine whether an individual was an active participant of OVC.”196
185 Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1045.
186 Id. (quoting Englebrecht II, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)).
187 Id. (quoting Englebrecht II, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 750, 752).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 1046 (quoting ATT’Y GEN.’S YOUTH GANG TASK FORCE, CAL. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
REPORT ON YOUTH GANG VIOLENCE IN CALIFORNIA 3 (1981)); see Weber County v. Ogden
Trece, 321 P.3d 1067, 1078 (Utah 2013) (explaining that the government claims that the
gang, “as an unincorporated association, does not have a known management structure,
officers, directors, or like managerial personnel”).
190 See Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1046 (citing United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160,
1169–70 (9th Cir. 2000)).
191 Id. at 1046–47.
192 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
193 Id. at 1047 (internal quotation marks omitted).
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
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Orange County argued that the state court made sufficient findings at
the preliminary injunction stage about gang membership.197 Importantly,
however, those findings were preliminary rather than final.198 Before the
defendants (plaintiff-appellees in this action) were able to present a defense
the OCDA dismissed them from the state court proceedings.199 Thus, “the
ultimate accuracy of the state court’s preliminary findings was—through no
fault of the state court—entirely undermined by the very procedural tactic
that gave rise to this lawsuit.”200
The court then analyzed the value of additional procedural safeguards.201 Although there was a purported “removal process, . . . the precise
nature of the process and the potential relief it offers remains unclear.”202
Nothing in the record indicated that the individuals served with the injunction were notified of the removal process when they were served.203 Lastly,
this procedural safeguard was insufficient because it placed the burden on
the individual to prove that he or she was not an active gang member when
California law requires the burden to be on the state.204
Orange County tried to assert that intervention was a sufficient procedural safeguard.205 The court quickly rejected that argument because the
plaintiffs had been dismissed from the action by the OCDA.206 It is absurd to
say that after being dismissed they should have moved to intervene.
The final Mathews factor to be considered is the government’s interest in
providing or refusing specific procedures.207 The operative question then is
“ ‘not whether [the county] has a significant interest in [combating gang violence]—no one doubts that [they] do[ ]—but rather whether [they] ha[ve]
a significant interest in’ failing to provide a pre-deprivation process through
which an individual can challenge [the county]’s allegations of his active
gang membership.”208 Orange County presented no evidence of “an administrative, fiscal or other substantial burden[ ] in providing . . . pre-deprivation
safeguards.”209 The record indicated that at least two other California juris197 Id. at 1048.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1049 (internal quotation marks omitted).
203 Id. at 1049–50. The court also noted that it was unclear whether the removal process would apply to named defendants only or to anyone served with the injunction. Id. at
1050.
204 See id. at 1050 (“Most critically, the burden is on the petitioning individual to
demonstrate that he or she is not an active gang participant, even though the State ordinarily has the burden of demonstrating active gang participation by ‘clear and convincing
evidence.’” (quoting Englebrecht II, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 752 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001))).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1052.
208 Vasquez, 734 F.3d at 1052 (quoting Humphries v. Cnty. of L.A., 554 F.3d 1170, 1194
(9th Cir. 2008)).
209 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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dictions provide such a process.210 There was also no evidence that pre-deprivation hearings would decrease the efficacy of the injunction against the
gang and its members.211 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court
that Orange County established no “administrative, fiscal or other substantial
burden[ ] in providing” pre-deprivation procedures to determine gang
membership.212
In conclusion, the court weighed the Mathews factors and determined
that there were very weighty interests at stake, a high probability of erroneous
deprivation under current practices, valuable potential additional procedural
safeguards, and no significant governmental interest in denying those procedures.213 It therefore affirmed the district court’s injunction against the
defendants, prohibiting them from enforcing the gang injunction.214 It held
that “some adequate process to determine membership in the covered class is
constitutionally required.”215
Vasquez, however, leaves many questions unanswered. It is unclear from
the majority opinion what difference in outcome, if any, would have resulted
had the county not used a dismiss-and-serve strategy. That strategy had a
considerable impact on the court’s weighing of the Mathews factors. The
concurring opinion explained at length that the weighing of the Mathews
factors
cannot be severed from [the county]’s unsettling and indefensible decision
to voluntarily dismiss every individual who tried to challenge the injunction
in the state court proceeding, and then serve those same dismissed individuals with the injunction it obtained uncontested. . . .
. . . Indeed, [the county]’s dismiss-and-serve strategy is the linchpin to its
procedural due process violation because today’s opinion applies only to
those individuals whom [the county] dismissed and later served.
We need not hold, and I do not read today’s opinion as holding, that
the post-deprivation procedural remedies that [the county] proffered are
constitutionally inadequate as to any other class of individuals.216

While Vasquez was clearly a victory for the critics of gang injunctions,
cities and counties still have several ways to continue using gang injunctions.
The first option would be to simply try to enjoin only named gang members.
Each member would be individually served with the suit and would be able to
contest his or her gang membership. The government would then only
request an injunction against those individuals who have been adjudicated to
be gang members. This would clearly withstand even the closest scrutiny
under Mathews, as each individual had a full opportunity to present his or her
defense.
210
211
212
213
214
215
216

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1053.
at 1052.
at 1053.
at 1056.
at 1074 (Tallman, J., concurring).
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While serving each member would solve Vasquez due process concerns,
there are significant drawbacks. Such a strategy would likely prove unwieldy
against the largest gangs. Even more importantly, though, is the static nature
of this type of an injunction. Any gang member who subsequently joins the
gang would not be bound. New suits would have to be filed for every new
gang member. Again, this would be particularly burdensome when applied
against large gangs whose membership is constantly in flux.
Surely a compromise strategy is possible—one that satisfies scrutiny
under Mathews but is not overly burdensome for the government. The government could, for example, bring suit against the gang as a whole and establish a clear definition of who qualifies as a gang member. The injunction
would then bind all the gang members, including future ones. The injunction could be served on anyone the police (or city attorney) believe meets
the definition. Upon being served with the injunction those individuals
would then be given the opportunity to contest their membership.217 Lastly,
before anyone was convicted of violating the injunction the state would have
to prove that the individual did meet the definition in the terms of the
injunction.
This compromise strategy is but one example of how the government
can institute procedural safeguards to ensure that the Due Process Clause is
not violated by gang injunctions. These safeguards certainly increase the cost
of the injunction when compared to cases that provide no opportunity to
contest gang membership. However, the cost is certainly less than naming
every individual to be covered by the injunction. If these injunctions are as
effective as cities and counties claim then surely it is money well spent. There
will undoubtedly be much experimentation across jurisdictions in establishing constitutionally mandated safeguards.
CONCLUSION
Anti-gang injunctions, while a relatively modern invention, are becoming increasingly popular. While gang injunctions cover a broad swath of
activities, they are justifiable in the face of public nuisance activity. Although
most public nuisance actions fall under statute, they are equitable at heart.
As such, the court must balance the public’s interest in quelling the nuisance
with the liberty interests of the enjoined.
Only with a proper understanding of the nuisance behavior itself, however, can the proper balance be struck. While critics of gang injunctions
have argued that the no-association provisions of most gang injunctions are
overinclusive because they allegedly prohibit non-nuisance behaviors, this
misunderstands the nature of the nuisance itself. In their battle to establish
control over “turf,” gangs take specific measures to ensure their presence is
felt in an area. Gang members are told that one of the cardinal laws of the
217 Differing systems to contest gang membership are possible. Perhaps there could be
some type of administrative hearing, which is appealable to the district court. Another
possibility would be to bring the dispute before the district court in the first instance.
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gang is to “represent” the gang at all times. This “representing” is accomplished through gang signs, clothing, symbols, colors, and the physical presence of members in the community.
The presence of multiple gang members who are all “representing” the
gang is meant to send a clear message to both the community and rival
gangs. The more a gang’s presence is felt the more effectively it may intimidate others and accomplish its other illicit objectives. This presence is, by the
gang’s very design, meant to intimidate and inspire fear. Thus the presence
does not just lead to other nuisance behavior (vandalism, drug dealing, trespassing, etc.)—it is itself nuisance behavior. This is what I have called the
presence theory.
With increasing popularity, government officials are choosing to sue
gangs as an entity either alone or in combination with named defendants.
District attorneys and police departments then serve and seek to enforce
these injunctions against individuals who had no part in the underlying
injunction hearings. These practices raise due process questions with which
courts have only just begun to wrestle. Vasquez v. Rackauckas is a recent, clear
victory for critics, although it remains to be seen if it was a major victory or a
minor one. Even after Vasquez, cities and counties still have a range of constitutionally permissible ways to continue using gang injunctions. Varying procedural safeguards will be implemented to protect served individuals’ due
process rights and satisfy scrutiny under Mathews. It appears then, that gang
injunctions are here to stay.
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